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AUTHORITY

AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (25 Jul 68)

FOR OT RD 682280

2 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th  
Transportation Command (Tml C), Period Ending 30 Apr 1968  
STATEMENT #2 UNCLASSIFIED

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with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should  
be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days  
of receipt of covering letter. *20310*

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appro-  
priate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current  
operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

1 Incl  
as

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (TML C)  
APO San Francisco 96307

AVCA SGN TC GCPT

28 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
(RCS CSFOR-65)

THRU: Commanding General  
US Army Support Command, Saigon  
ATTN: AVCA SGN GO  
APO 96491

Commanding General  
1st Logistical Command  
ATTN: AVCA GO O  
APO 96384

Deputy Commanding General  
United States Army, Vietnam  
ATTN: AVHGC-DH  
APO 96375

Commander in Chief  
United States Army, Pacific  
ATTN: GPOP-OT  
APO 96558

TO: Department of the Army  
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSFOR)  
Washington, D.C. 20310

## 1. Section I. Significant Activities

a. There were several organizational changes within the command during the reporting period (see Inclosure 1, organizational chart):

(1) The 300th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) and 117th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) were inactivated per paragraph 1, General Order #41, Headquarters, US Army Pacific, APO 96558, 22 January 1968 (Incl 2).

(2) The attachment of the 1st Composite Platoon, 567th Transportation Company, to 1097th Transportation Company was revoked by paragraph 1, General

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Order #4, this headquarters. The platoon was attached to US Army Transportation Battalion Vung Tau/Delta (Provisional), with duty station at Dong Tam, by the same General Order, 22 March 1968, (Incl 3).

(3) The Saigon Field Office, 524th Military Intelligence Detachment which provided counterintelligence support to the command was attached to this headquarters for logistical support only, per paragraph 1, General Order #411, US Army Support Command, Saigon, 19 April 1968. Operational control of the unit was retained by US Army Support Command, Saigon (Incl 4).

(4) The 329th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat) and 561st Transportation Company (Terminal Service) were reassigned to US Army Support Command, Saigon, by paragraph 1, General Order #327, Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon, 1 April 1968 (Incl 5). These units were later reassigned to US Army Support Command, Da Nang (Provisional).

b. Key Commanders and Staff Officers at the end of the reporting period are listed on Inclosure 6.

c. During this reporting period the enlisted strength of the command steadily declined. Since last report, the command has received 753 enlisted replacements as opposed to a loss of 1,639 enlisted men. This loss of personnel includes those of the 561st Transportation Company (Terminal Service), and the 329th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat). The enlisted personnel from the deactivation of the 117th and 300th Transportation Companies (Terminal Service) were reassigned to units within the 4th Transportation Command. The below listed units contributed to the loss of assigned and authorized strength of the command during this period.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AUTH STR</u>	<u>ASG STR</u>
*117th Transportation Company (Terminal Service)	323 EM	157 EM
*300th Transportation Company (Terminal Service)	323 EM	69 EM
**329th Transportation Company (Heavy Boat)	100 EM	120 EM
**561st Transportation Company (Terminal Service)	323 EM	289 EM

\*Note - Units were reduced to zero authorized and assigned strength and deactivated.

\*\*Note - Units were relieved from attached this command.

d. During the reporting period 258 deep draft vessels arrived for discharge at the four major subordinate terminals of this command. Total tonnage discharged and backloaded for the period was 860,770 S/T. Inclosure 7 contains a summary of vessels and tonnage discharge/backload.

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e. During this reporting period, the command cost of performance (based on military, local national, contractual and supply costs) showed a 6 per cent decline over the previously reported quarter, dropping from 11.0 to 10.3 million. During these three months, the command wide cost of performance was approximately 3.4 million dollars per month. The bulk of the command's costs continued to be in the area of military labor. The decline over the prior period can be ascribed to a significant reduction in contractual expenditures at US Army Terminal, Saigon and US Army Terminal, Cat Lai.

f. Contracts Funded:

(1) On 22 February 1968, the command was granted funds in the amount of \$850,000 for stevedore operations at US Army Terminal, Newport from that date until the end of the Fiscal Year. Experience to date indicates that the contractual costs at US Army Terminal, Newport will be 20% to 30% higher than for comparable services at Saigon and Cat Lai Terminals. Because of the high level of costs, as well as an increased scope of work under the contract, additional funds will be required before the end of Fiscal Year 1968.

(2) On 18 March 1968, the command was granted funds in the amount of \$24,500 for the certification by the Transportation Officer, 125th Transportation Command, of charges incident to the discharge of commercially manifested Army interest cargo. This procedure will replace the Army Blanket-Purchase Agreement with the Compagnie Saigonaise de Transit who, for a fee, acted as the Army's agent in the payment of such charges.

(3) On 31 March 1968, the Blanket Purchase Agreement with Compagnie Saigonaise de Transit expired and was not renewed. Funds granted for this Blanket Purchase Agreement will be returned to 33rd Finance in the approximate amount of \$100,000.

(4) On 31 March 1968, the Army contract with Central Navigation and Trading for operation of discharge sites at Binh Trieu and Thanh Tuy Ha was discontinued and not renewed. Under a Joint Military Assistance Command, Vietnam and Army Republic of Vietnam Agreement, the responsibility for the operation of these sites has been assumed by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.

g. On 26 February 1968, as a result of action initiated by this headquarters, the command discontinued the mandatory hiring of 288 extra laborers, previously hired as a condition of the settlement of the strike at Newport in December 1966. On 14 March 1968, the agreement between Headquarters, US Army Vietnam and the Port Workers Union was officially terminated. This action has resulted in an estimated savings to the US Army of \$34,491 per month and has been submitted through command channels for validation under the Department of the Army Cost Reduction Program.

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h. Visitors during the reporting period are listed in Inclosure 8.

2. Section II. Commander's Observations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

ITEM. Malassigned Personnel.

OBSERVATION. This command continues to be hindered in the attainment of its full potential because of many malassigned personnel. During a large rotational peak, July through October 1967, many individuals were assigned to units of this command who were neither trained for, nor had experience in, terminal operations. Although these individuals assisted, they placed a continual drain on the already taxed available trained workforce in the way of instructors for on-the-job training. Additionally, many accidents, some of a serious nature were caused by these individuals being unaware of the inherent dangers and accident potentials associated with a terminal type operation.

EVALUATION. Many manhours continue to be expended through a continuous on-the-job program to the detriment of unit mission accomplishment. The reduced production capability of the unit is further aggravated by the accidents induced by untrained personnel.

RECOMMENDATION. That the maximum effort be made to assign trained personnel at all levels within this command.

b. Operations.

(1) ITEM. Increased enemy attacks by small arms, rockets, and mortar fire directed against lighterage transiting the Song Dong Nai have increased casualties and damage sustained.

OBSERVATION. After-action reports received at this headquarters indicate that injuries and damages sustained could be reduced significantly by adopting an increased readiness posture while in these waters. On two occasions, 65 foot tugs took RPG hits in the galley area (center of mass) which resulted in personnel casualties. It was also noted that the tug personnel have not taken all possible defensive actions upon receiving fire. A command letter was forwarded to the commanders of all boat units of the command. This policy letter provided that all crew served weapons will be manned while traveling on the Song Dong Nai (River). Copies of the battalion's SOP for Vessel Evasive Action were requested to ensure compliance.

EVALUATION. Major subordinate commanders of boat units have reviewed their vessel security procedures and instituted SOPs which provide for all military personnel to be at General Quarters while traveling dangerous waters.

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These SOPs further provide that all crew served weapons will be manned and that personnel avoid the galley area. These SOPs also formalize procedures for evasive actions in the event of attack.

RECOMMENDATION. That all after-action reports receive careful attention to detect areas where changes in procedure may be helpful in reducing to a minimum personnel and material losses on future harborcraft missions.

(2) ITEM. Emergency communication procedures for vessels on the Song Dong Nai River.

OBSERVATION. On several occasions organic vessels (tugs and LCMs) of the command on the Song Dong Nai River traveling between Cat Lai and Cogido have reported by radio that they were receiving enemy fire. The Administrative Harbormaster Radio Net has not proven satisfactory in that direct communication to obtain immediate assistance from helicopter gunship, artillery, medical evacuation, illumination, and/or reaction force support has not been immediately available. This problem has been solved by establishing a tactical radio net. All organic vessels are now required to operate on the tactical radio net of the Cat Lai Army Terminal when traveling between Cat Lai and Cogido. Tactical support units monitor this net and provide immediate assistance as required.

EVALUATION. All vessels traversing this waterway now monitor the tactical net and excellent improvements have resulted.

RECOMMENDATION. That tactical radio nets be established for boat units traveling in areas where hostile fire is likely to be sustained.

(3) ITEM. Defense of Newport Army Terminal.

OBSERVATION. On 31 January 1968, intelligence reports indicated the probability of intensified enemy activity with an attack on Newport Army Terminal. Immediate action was taken to increase the defense readiness posture of Newport. The Terminal entrance gate was fortified, additional personnel were placed on guard and a high degree of alertness was maintained while continuing the port terminal operations. Permission was requested and subsequently granted to process six Armored Personnel Carriers (APC's) with mounted 50 caliber machine guns from the port vehicle staging area. In the early morning hours of 1 February 1968, a coordinated enemy ground attack was launched against Newport Army Terminal from the North and East. The APC's proved to be most effective and were credited not only with repelling the attack but also with saving the Newport Bridge from destruction. Five VC bodies were found on the Newport Bridge on the morning of 1 February 1968. During the attack, considerable difficulty was experienced in communicating with adjacent ARVN ground forces and with direct support US medical and combat units engaged in defensive operations.

EVALUATION. Armored Personnel Carriers were invaluable in the defense of Newport Army Terminal. As a result of the experience gained during the TET offensive, four APC's were authorized for use with the Newport Security

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force. Major subordinate army terminals of the command must have complete, fully integrated terminal defense plans which provide for direct communications with direct support medical and combat units. Necessary liaison with direct support units must be continuous to ensure immediately available, responsive combat support in the event of an attack. Defense plans must be timely and simple.

RECOMMENDATIONS. (a) That the use of other than organic weapons and equipment be considered when the tactical situation indicates that organic weapons and equipment are inadequate.

(b) That major subordinate Army Terminals maintain complete, fully integrated terminal defense plans which provide for direct communication with direct support medical and combat units.

c. Training.

ITEM. Insufficient Number of Trained Drivers.

OBSERVATION. During the recent TET offensive, many civilian contract truck drivers were unable to work due to a 24 hour curfew imposed as a result of enemy activity. When military personnel of the command were assigned to drive cargo vehicles only a small percentage of assigned personnel were available for duty with necessary truck driver qualifications. A requirement has since been established which directs major subordinate commands to train additional military personnel as drivers of medium trucks for future emergencies of this type.

EVALUATION. Each subordinate command is now prepared to provide qualified military medium truck drivers for use during emergencies. Future plans are to cross-train an adequate number of military personnel to drive all types of vehicles in order to provide an in-house capability for port clearance when LN drivers are not available.

RECOMMENDATION. That training programs be established to train terminal military personnel to drive all types of vehicles and equipment for use during emergencies.

d. Intelligence.

ITEM. Intelligence collection and dissemination during the Viet Cong TET offensive.

OBSERVATION. The Viet Cong TET offensive, launched in the Saigon/Cholon area on 31 January 1968, disrupted the normally reliable flow of intelligence to this command. By 2 February 1968, it became apparent that this headquarters could not depend solely on the downward distribution of information on the attacking enemy and the threat posed to the US Army Terminals at Saigon,

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Newport, Cat Lai, and Vung Tau/Delta and to boats operating on the inland waterways, through normal intelligence channels. The conflicting information, rumors and general confusion that followed in the wake of the initial shock of the enemy's attack, dramatized the need for a fast, systematic and responsive intelligence collection/dissimination effort in a new environment. The initial estimate of the situation concluded that this command would have to improvise if intelligence was to reach the point of decision, the commander. In response to the commander's urgent need for intelligence, the ACofS, G-2 installed members of his staff at G-2, Capitol Military District (CMD), on a 24-hour basis to monitor all intelligence collected on the enemy forces. The G-2 office at this headquarters likewise became operational on a 24-hour basis. The VC TET offensive demonstrated the ability of insurgent forces to deny logistical commanders the intelligence required upon which to make decisions and issue orders.

**EVALUATION.** The highlight of this effort was the speed with which information was relayed from CMD to the G-2 of this command for presentation to the Commander and his staff and its dissemination to subordinate and adjacent commands. Increased liaison with the National Police and other intelligence agencies augmented the knowledge of the enemy and his threat to this command. The intelligence initially denied this command by enemy activity was quickly restored through the ingenuity and aggressiveness of the Military Intelligence Officers assigned to this headquarters. Although hampered by authorized strength and a faltering communication system, the commander maintained a timely and accurate estimate of the enemy threat to his command on a 24-hour basis during the most critical period of this command's history in Vietnam. The value of this intelligence is borne out by the operational accomplishments of the command during this period and the minimal casualties and damage sustained. A significant factor that contributed to the success of this command's intelligence effort during this critical period was the assignment of Military Intelligence Officers. The 524th MI Saigon Field Office, which was tasked to provide this command with counterintelligence support, became isolated almost immediately after the initial attack, and consequently was unable to provide this support. Based on this unique experience it is considered essential that, in the insurgency environment, Military Intelligence Officers continue to be assigned to the intelligence positions of this command, to insure that the commander possesses a professional staff capable of dealing with situations similar in nature to the VC TET offensive.

**RECOMMENDATION.** (a) That implementation of the above collection/dissimination machinery be established, as required, whenever sufficient information on the enemy situation is not available.

(b) That intelligence information be expeditiously disseminated to not only subordinate commands of the headquarters, but to other commands in the Saigon Port complex i.e. Traffic Management, Military Sea Transport Service and 506th Field Depot.

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## e. Logistics.

### (1) ITEM. Lack of PLL and ASL support for new equipment.

**OBSERVATION.** When new items of equipment, rolling or floating, arrive in country, it is normally three to six months or longer before adequate PLL and ASL are available to insure adequate support. Requisitions for spare parts on a priority basis have not solved this problem. Pertinent Technical Manuals in many cases are not available when the equipment arrives. Specific problems were experienced during this period with the 6,000 and 10,000 pound Rough Terrain Fork Lift.

**EVALUATION.** Extreme climatic and terrain operating conditions result in high deadline of non-supportable new equipment. Cannibalization of a new non-supportable item most frequently results in order to keep the remainder of items in operation.

**RECOMMENDATIONS.** That a pre-packaged PLL (6mos) accompany each new item of equipment arriving in-country with concurrent delivery to the receiving unit. That a pre-packaged ASL be provided to support units in the general location of using unit. Normal supply procedures should be implemented only after adequate support stock levels are firmly established in-country.

### (2) ITEM. Maintenance of proper temperatures of chill and freeze cargo.

**OBSERVATION.** In a tropical environment of high heat and high humidity, maintaining proper temperatures of chill and freeze cargo during unloading and transporting is a major problem.

**EVALUATION.** Close supervision, rapid transport, use of hatch tents and truck cargo tarps have reduced spoilage and deterioration of chill cargo. Freeze cargo is normally transported in standard CONEX containers. The standard container is not adequate to prevent temperature loss. Reefer vans are not available for ship unloading operations.

**RECOMMENDATIONS.** (1) Provide a foam insulated CONEX type container for the transport of freeze cargo.

(2) Paint standard CONEX's with heat reflective paint inside and out when they are to be used to move freeze cargo.

## f. Organisation.

### (1) ITEM. Marine Maintenance Support of Assigned Equipment.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 Apr 68 (RCS CSFOR-65)

**OBSERVATION:** Sufficient floating craft are assigned this command to justify the assignment of a Floating Craft Maintenance Company, TOE 55-157. At the present time no such unit is assigned. This command is experiencing a continuing increase in the number of assigned floating craft due to increasing operational missions. This factor will compound the already critical marine maintenance problem. An MTOE requesting assignment of a Team IE, Floating Craft Maintenance and Repair consisting of ninety-four men, was submitted in March 1968.

**EVALUATION.** The assignment of an IE Team to this command is being delayed due to a manpower ceiling imposed by higher headquarters. Thus, spaces are not presently available for the formation of the required team. A complete solution will be achieved only when adequate maintenance support is programmed by staff planners concurrent with equipment assignment.

**RECOMMENDATIONS.** That upon assignment of equipment assets to any organization, sufficient coordination be accomplished by DA Staff to insure that adequate maintenance support is programmed to arrive concurrently, or preferable, prior to equipment arrival in order to provide adequate support.

(2) **ITEM.** Elimination of technical service sections from this headquarters. (Terminal C TOE 55-111D)

**OBSERVATION.** This headquarters (Terminal C, TOE 55-111D) is authorized technical service sections to perform liaison between the terminal commander and the technical services; to act as technical advisors to the commander and all operating agencies of the command on matters pertaining to the identification, handling, movement and distribution of cargo; to supervise the operation dumps when located in the terminal area; and to provide the terminal command with normal station services. Since the technical service concept has been replaced by the functionalized (one stop supply maintenance and service) concept, and since this headquarters functions not as a terminal operator but as a senior headquarters for planning and administration of water terminal operations in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones, a revision of the technical service area was required to realign skills with functions to be performed as dictated by the mission. The revision entailed the elimination of the technical service sections and the establishment of a functionalized G4 which incorporated the required technical service skills for staff supervision of the supply, maintenance and service activities being performed within the command. As a result, this headquarters has submitted an MTOE incorporating the above change.

**EVALUATION.** The actual reconfiguration of the G4 Division has enabled this headquarters to surpass previous assistance to, and staff supervision over supply, maintenance and service activities in subordinate units.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 Apr 68 (RCS CLFOR-65)

RECOMMENDATIONS. That the Golf series TOE's for terminal headquarters be published expeditiously so that organization for terminal operations will interlace with other aspects of logistical operations to be performed in accordance with current doctrine, i.e., COSTAR and TASTA 70.

g. Other.

(1) ITEM. Movement of outsized cargo.

OBSERVATION. 4th Transportation Command frequently receives outsized and overweight cargo which cannot be transported inland from pierside to the consignee because of the non-availability of 60-ton lowboys. The excessive weight, length or height of this special type cargo requires arrangements for special transportation contracts.

EVALUATION. Port clearance personnel are being provided advance cargo vessel summaries requirements for special transportation contracts. Prior planning makes possible the arrangement of commercial contracts in sufficient time for expeditious port clearance of cargo.

RECOMMENDATION. That a limited number of 60-ton low-bed trailers and 10-ton tractors be provided to select elements of USASUPCOM, Saigon to be committed as required.

(2) ITEM. Newport Stevedore Contract Funds.

OBSERVATION. On 22 February 1968, the command was granted funds in the amount of \$850,000 for stevedore operations at US Army Terminal, Newport. These funds were for the period 22 February 1968 to 30 June 1968. Experience factors gathered thus far indicate that the contractual costs at US Army Terminal, Newport will be 20 - 30% higher than for comparable services at Saigon and Cat Lai Terminals.

EVALUATION. A portion of the higher stevedore costs at Newport are attributable to a contract imposed 100% labor differential which is paid for labor outside the Saigon area. This differential was not a negotiable matter at the time the contract was completed. However, the commodity rates were a negotiable matter. These commodity rates are substantially higher for identical commodities at the Saigon Terminal. The time permitted to negotiate the Newport Stevedores Contract was extremely limited; this limitation severely curtailed the bargaining position of the US Army in the agreement.

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RECOMMENDATION. That, insofar as tactical and operational contingencies dictate, contract requirements be forecast as far in advance as possible to provide for adequate negotiating time.



DEWITT C. HOWELL  
Colonel, TC  
Commanding

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 7 June 1968  
(RCS CSFOR-65) 4th Transportation Command (TML-C)

HQ, US Army Support Command, Saigon, APO San Francisco 96491 5 June 1968

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, APO 96375

Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development, Department of the Army,  
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968, of the 4th Transportation Command (TML C), is forwarded in accordance with the provisions of para 9, AR 1-19.

2. Reference: Section II, E1:

a. The 4th Transportation Command is not authorized to maintain an ASL for floating equipment. The ASL is maintained by the US Army Marine Maintenance Activity, Vietnam (USAMMAV). Concur with recommendation that PLL and ASL be shipped with the equipment; however, only the PLL should be shipped to the 4th Transportation Command. When USAMMAV processes the floating equipment for issue, the ASL should be removed.

b. There are up-dated TM's for most floating craft assigned to the 4th Trans Comd; however, they have not been made available to this command. When this headquarters requisitioned TM's for floating craft, the following TM's were listed as under revision and no TM supplied: 1. TM 55-1905-202-12P, LCM VIII; 2. TM 55-1935-204-12P, 100 Ton Crane; 3. TM 55-1940-201-20P, 46 ft Picket Boat. Many additional TM's are listed in DA Pamphlet 310-4 but are coded so that they may not be requisitioned. Also no TM is available for Y-Tankers.

c. DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to D. Publications) was submitted on 30 May 68, recommending the following:

(1) The TM for the 100 ft Tug be revised to include the nut which secures the propeller on the shaft.

(2) Up-dated manuals be published for Y-Tankers. Presently, only out-dated Supply Catalogs which give TC stock numbers are available.

(3) Manuals listed on requisitions as under revision be made available in any form.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 7 June 1968  
(RCS CSFOR-65)

### 3. Reference: Section II, para 2g(1):

At the present time the problem of moving heavy lift cargo, other than self-propelled vehicles, is accomplished on a case-by-case rental basis with a commercial contractor presently working for the US Navy; the cost is excessive. Bids have been received on a FY 69 commercial trucking contract, which includes a 40 ton 40 ft low bed trailer pulled by a 10 ton rated capacity tractor capability; this equipment is scheduled to be in country by 15 October. This capability will satisfy requirements to transport heavy equipment within III CTZ, at a more reasonable unit cost. Organic tank transporters provide lift capability for items over 40 tons.

4. Lessons Learned, observations, and recommendations are concurred in by this command, with the exceptions noted above. A copy of this indorsement has been provided to the originating headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TAL: LB 2604



FREDERICK R. HUCK  
Colonel, GS  
Chief of Staff

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AVCA GO-O (28 May 68) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 7 June  
1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) 4th Transportation Command (TML-C)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384

15 JUN 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,  
APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, 4th Transportation Command (TML-C) for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference Section II, paragraph d. Concur with recommendation. The 524th Military Intelligence Detachment (CI) presently maintains 24 hour liaison with G-2 Capital Military District, however during periods of increased enemy activity in the Saigon area, the 524th MID will physically position a liaison agent on a 24 hour basis in the office of G-2 Capital Military District. Information collected will be expeditiously disseminated to 4th Transportation Command and all other 1st Logistical Command units and installations in the Saigon area. This procedure should provide the commander with additional intelligence upon which to make decisions. This headquarters has no objection if a representative from G-2, 4th Transportation Command maintains liaison with the Capital Military District for the purpose of obtaining intelligence information.

b. Reference Section II, paragraph e(1) and paragraph 2, 1st Indorsement. Nonconcur with recommendation and paragraph 2a, 1st Indorsement. 1st Log Comd Reg 700-70, dated 19 Dec 67, Subject: Distribution of Support Items for New Equipment, places direct responsibility for adequate support for new items of equipment with the 14th Inventory Control Center. A mission support plan is distributed by the 14th ICC through the support commands prior to the introduction into RVN of a new item of equipment. Section IV, paragraph 11, subparagraph g, of the cited regulation enumerates the actions to be taken at each repair parts supply level. Failure to receive the mission support plan prior to the receipt of a new item of equipment should be brought to the attention of the 14th ICC through the respective support command. Concur with paragraphs 2b and c, 1st Indorsement.

c. Reference Section II, paragraph e(2). Nonconcur with recommendation. COMEX container type II (CH) is specifically designed for this type cargo; therefore modification to standard COMEX containers is not considered appropriate.

d. Section II, paragraph f(1). Referenced MTCE has not been received

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 7 June  
1968 (RCS CSFOR-65) 4th Transportation Command (TML-C)


at this headquarters.

e. Section II, paragraph f(2). Referenced MTOE has not been received at this headquarters.

f. Reference Section II, paragraph g(2), Newport Stevedore Contract Funds. Concur. This particular contract was negotiated during the TMT Offensive. Normally ample time is provided for contract negotiations.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by indorsements. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



TEL: LBN 2684

J. S. WADDELL

1LT, AGC

Ass't Adjutant General

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19  
AVHGC-DST (28 May 68) 3d Ind

CPT Arnold/hga/LBN 4485

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968  
(RCS CSFOR-65)


HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 19 JUN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters, 4th Transportation Command.

2. Concur with report as submitted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



**JOHN V. GETCHELL**  
Captain, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished:  
HQ, 1st Log Cmd  
HQ, 4th Trans Cmd

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GPOP-DT (28 May 68) 4th Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 4th Trans Comd for Period Ending  
30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 12 JUL 1968


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-  
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

*C.L. Shortt*

C.L. SHORTT  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG



UNIT MADE UP OF TDA  
P5 WCJ 19900 SPACES

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (TML C)  
APO San Francisco 96307

Key Commanders and Staff Officers at the end of the Reporting Period

Commanding Officer: Colonel DeWitt C. Howell, TC  
Deputy Commanding Officer: Colonel Arthur W. Delaney, TC  
Chief of Staff: Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Hessler, TC  
AC of S, G-1: Lieutenant Colonel William F. Ruby, AGC  
AC of S, G-2: Lieutenant Colonel Richard F. Judge, MI  
AC of S, G-3: Lieutenant Colonel Frederick H. Hagreen, Jr, TC  
AC of S, G-4: Lieutenant Colonel Richard H. Devereaux, ORDC  
AC of S, Comptroller: Major Reinhard M. Lotz, TC  
Inspector General: Lieutenant Colonel Ward Garee, Jr, IG  
Staff Judge Advocate: Captain Lewis J. Rose, JAGC  
Adjutant General: Major Donald B. Dixon, AGC  
Operations Branch: Lieutenant Colonel Paul R. Johnson, TC  
Cargo Accounting Branch: Lieutenant Colonel Albert A. Helker, TC  
Plans and Training Branch: Lieutenant Colonel Frank H. Dunagan, ORDC  
Transportation Branch: Lieutenant Colonel Harold Smith, TC  
Maintenance Branch: Chief Warrant William L. Brett, USA  
Engineer Branch: Major William R. Licht, CE  
Purchasing and Contracting Branch: Captain Thomas J. LaFond, TC  
Supply Branch: Major Paul G. Hassel, QM  
Signal Branch: Major Ernest E. Willis, SIG  
Review and Analysis: First Lieutenant Stephen L. Belgum, AGC  
Management Service Branch: Captain Charles F. Holland, TC  
Fiscal Branch: First Lieutenant Philip J. Ringo, AGC  
Chaplain: Lieutenant Colonel James H. Woods, CH  
Information Branch: Captain James H. Clingham, INF  
Headquarters Commandant: Major Basil N. Morris, INF  
Civilian Labor Officer: Captain Kenneth E. Houston, AGC  
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 4th Transportation Command  
(Terminal C): Major Basil N. Morris, INF  
125th Transportation Command (Terminal A) (US Army Terminal, Saigon):  
Colonel Lloyd A. Osborne, TC  
11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) (US Army Terminal, Cat Lai):  
Lieutenant Colonel Edger V. Friend, Jr, TC  
US Army Terminal Newport: Colonel Clarence E. McCandless, TC  
71st Transportation Battalion (Terminal): Lieutenant Colonel John  
P. Santry, TC  
US Army Transportation Battalion Vung Tau/Delta (Provisional) (US  
Army Terminal Vung Tau/Delta): Lieutenant Colonel William F. Pleier, TC

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (TMC C)  
APO San Francisco 96307

SUMMARY OF VESSELS AND TONNAGE

1. Vessel Status:	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>	<u>APRIL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
US Army Terminal, Saigon	22	18	31	71
US Army Terminal, Newport	25	28	26	79
US Army Terminal, Cat Lai	10	13	12	35
US Army Terminal, Vung Tau/Delta	23	24	26	73
	<u>80</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>258</u>

2. Tonnage Discharged and Backloaded:

	US Army Terminal Saigon	US Army Terminal Newport	US Army Terminal Cat Lai	US Army Terminal Vung Tau/Delta	TOTAL
<u>MONTH OF FEBRUARY</u>					
S/T DISCHARGED	78,422	58,662	35,812	20,621	193,517
S/T BACKLOADED	<u>4,647</u>	<u>14,829</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>2,915</u>	<u>22,396</u>
S/T TOTAL	83,069	73,491	35,817	23,536	215,913
<u>MONTH OF MARCH</u>					
S/T DISCHARGED	115,775	77,850	43,025	37,081	273,731
S/T BACKLOADED	<u>13,759</u>	<u>26,881</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>6,418</u>	<u>47,058</u>
S/T TOTAL	129,534	104,731	43,025	43,499	320,789
<u>MONTH OF APRIL</u>					
S/T DISCHARGED	109,492	78,236	47,515	33,998	269,241
S/T BACKLOADED	<u>13,147</u>	<u>33,845</u>	<u>614</u>	<u>7,221</u>	<u>54,827</u>
S/T TOTAL	122,639	112,081	48,129	41,219	324,068
TOTAL	335,242	290,303	126,971	108,254	860,770

\*Note - The total tonnage handled by the four US Army Terminals during the month of February represents a decrease from the months of March and April due to TET Offensive.

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